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___________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Why and how is it that a particular 
phenomenon, perhaps previously 
ignored or apparently inactive or 
remote1 — an image, for instance, or 
some other presentation in or of the 
world — may suddenly break into a life 
and effect change? What does it 
'know'? What, to cite Maurice Merleau-
Ponty, the French phenomenologist 
and philosopher of embodiment, is its 
"secret science"?2 And how do these 
forms of knowledge relate to our own, 
and to our own processes and 
practices of learning and teaching? 
 
I 
Re-thinking Thought  
Recently, leafing through a volume of 
Byzantine icon paintings,3 my gaze 
was drawn in by a late fourteenth-
century image of a writer: Saint Mark 
the Evangelist. He had been portrayed 
very simply, from the waist upwards. 
He was holding a large closed book 
with one hand and a poised pen in the 
other. His head was slightly bowed, 
and his bearing was one of intense 
concentration. Indeed, the image as a 
whole had a sense of self-
containment, density and 
removedness. Although it was ‘about’ 
communication and communion, it 
made no direct appeal to me as its 
viewer and seemed indifferent to my 
presence. Nonetheless, as I looked, I 
realised that I had received a wordless 
answer to a question I had been 
pondering about my own attitudes to 
writing (why am I finding it so difficult 
and how might I start enjoying it 
again?). I couldn't have said what this 
answer was. Knowledge had been 
made flesh before being made word. 
But words, in the form of a brief 
commentary accompanying the image, 
soon followed, making it possible to re-
approach the image through 
difference, that is, through the 
perspectives of another, differently 
positioned and differently interested 
viewer of the work. As such, I had a 
place from which to start reflecting on 
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the 'something' that had happened in 
me on the level of the visceral, and to 
start activating it, consciously and 
critically. Since learning and teaching 
in the arts, like art-making itself, are so 
often poised in the dichotomy between 
being analytically or theoretically 
informed on the one hand, and being 
wordlessly/mythically inspired on the 
other, this manner of consciously and 
critically activating that which has been 
gleaned at another level of perception, 
becomes exceptionally important in 
the context of 'Academy'. 
  
Returning to the icon, from my reading 
it became clear that the answer I had 
received had been embedded in the 
specificities of its composition and 
colour. Key was the way in which the 
Evangelist's body had been depicted. 
The relationship between his head and 
his torso had been somewhat distorted 
(the neck was significantly 
broadened), in order to emphasise, 
pictorially, that for Mark, writing was an 
activity in which "mind and heart are 
united in knowledge and prayer".4 This 
pre-modern conception of the heart as 
"the centre of knowledge and 
motivation" was further reinforced in 
the image. The Evangelist's dark 
green cloak created a billowing effect 
that extended the bodily dimensions of 
his torso, making it expansive and 
dynamic. His pen pointed towards this 
interior space, specifically to the region 
of his heart. Simultaneously, it pointed 
to the book, which could be seen to 
function, positionally (as well as 
through its surface design and its red 
pages), as an externalised, geometric 
analogue of that heart. Certainly, the 
legible, symbolic values present in the 
image had played their part in 
addressing me, signalling a certain 
congruence of situation (the fact that a 
writer was shown, holding the 
tools/outcomes of his trade). But it was 
to the painting's inner workings — its 
critical materialities — that I had found 
myself unexpectedly apprenticed.  
 
Critical materialities? 
The concept of 'critical materialities' 
makes sense, but only outside of the 
dualistic/Cartesian understandings of 
the mind/matter inter-relationship that 
were introduced in the early modern 
period and have remained dominant in 
the west and in western-influenced 
environments ever since (despite the 
rise of various so-called postmodernist 
positions). As such, it has a 
productively contradictory contribution 
to make to contemporary debates 
about what it might mean to think and 
know, and thus to learn and teach.  
 
As I will try to show, fundamentally at 
issue is its capacity to generate two 
different modes of attention. The first 
is rooted in, and generated by, the 
singular, internal inter-workings of 
J Andrews, Critical Materialities, 2006 3 
phenomena, with these experienced 
as taking the lead in the production of 
thought. Sometimes (as in my 
experience with the St Mark icon) this 
kind of contact is unexpected and 
apparently unbidden, and might be 
described as a directedness that is 
derived from things or phenomena to 
viewers.  
 
Often, however, the phenomenal self-
showing at issue is in long-exposure 
mode and a capacity to connect with it 
must to cultivated. Since this self-
showing frequently operates on pre-
linguistic registers, this requires, on 
our part, that certain long-play 
activities not generally associated with 
intellectual or critical work, and often 
identified as 'representational' or 
'mimetic', are brought into play. I am 
thinking of such activities of 
attunement as description and 
transcription, for instance. In Merleau-
Pontean terms, forms of bodily 
knowledge or knowledge-through-
contact are at issue here. Interestingly, 
such intercorporeal conceptions of 
knowledge have been elaborated 
more recently, both by the Italian 
political theorist Giorgio Agamben, and 
by the American/American-based 
theorists Leo Bersani and Ulysse 
Dutoit, with particular reference to 
experiences of rubbing and being 
rubbed. (I will return to this theme 
later.) The outcome of all of these 
experiences and activities is an 
expanded conception of where and 
how thought is located, and how it 
circulates. Certainly it is not 
experienced as rooted in an 
autonomous Cartesian/humanist 
cogito or 'I think'. 
 
The second mode of attention 
contrasts with the first, but exists 
alongside it. It involves becoming 
radically conscious of one's own 
concrete relationships to other people, 
things, information and ideas and it 
takes this awareness as a starting-
point for further thought, research and 
action. But it does so in a way that, 
once again, works against an 
autonomous sense of self/thought. 
When it comes to the communication 
of knowledge or expertise ('teaching'), 
this is likewise situated, perspectival 
and relational. A given territory is 
entered into in a singularised way, not 
in order to produce some new 
orthodoxy, but to create positions of 
difference from which others may 
develop their own equally situated 
(counter)-explorations and (counter)-
positions.  
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A Pedagogical Challenge 
 
Between December 2005 and January 
2006, the installation Kiosk: ‘Modes of 
Multiplication' & 'Liam Gillick: Edgar 
Schmitz' was on show at the Institute 
of Contemporary Art in London. Kiosk 
was/is a travelling archive of artists 
books, periodicals, alternative 
magazines, self-publication projects 
and audio and video work, curated 
differently and by different individuals 
in each location of display. Liam 
Gillick: Edgar Schmitz was the title 
given to the way in which Gillick, with 
fellow artist and theorist, Schmitz, 
curated the contents of Kiosk at the 
ICA. My interest in this installation is 
that it provides a rich contemporary 
context for discussing the pedagogical 
implications of 'critical materialities'. 
This is because it enacts and opens 
up for scrutiny a specific pedagogical 
challenge that now characterises a 
wide variety of communicative 
contexts. 
 
This challenge is activated by the 
overlap of two scenarios. One 
concerns the increasingly 
democratised, technologised, and thus 
accelerated conditions of information 
production and circulation, certainly 
within economically developed regions 
of the world — the proliferation of 
'stuff' that must somehow be 
navigated. The other is a broadly 'non-
representationalist' orientation towards 
information/communication. This 
orientation has a fairly long history 
from a theoretical standpoint,5 but is 
becoming ever more recurrent in 
everyday educational contexts ranging 
from the sales promotion to the 
television documentary, gallery display 
and university seminar room. A 
tendency here is to emphasise the 
‘production of new meanings' through 
speculative and often uncontextualised 
explorations of the information/image-
world, which is itself conceptualised as 
an archive of fragmentary phenomena 
to be sampled, arranged and 
rearranged. This overall state of affairs 
leads to pedagogical situations 
marked by degrees of evasiveness, 
elusiveness, opacity or muteness. A 
weakness of this orientation is that the 
provision of 'background' information is 
often equated with practices of 
imposition. But a strength is its 
openness and the way in which it calls 
into question the traditional 
pedagogical value placed on what 
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Merleau-Ponty called the "school-
master's question" — the question that 
is "asked of someone who doesn’t 
know by someone who knows".6 
 
In the ICA show, this doubled scenario 
was enacted though the device of 
offering (or appearing to offer) its 
visitors at once 'too much' and 'too 
little'. 'Too little' was offered because 
rather than "examine how publishers 
and editors, as well as artists, work 
within the context and constraints of 
printed and recorded material" as 
claimed, the show merely presented 
the uncontextualised outcomes of 
those activities. As such (certainly at 
first glance) it provided visitors with 
insufficient conceptual resources with 
which to approach the materials on 
display. This sense of paucity was 
intensified by the purposefully non-
contextualised inclusion of other 
elements that (on the level of content) 
seemed to be only randomly 
connected to the show as a whole. 
One of these was a painting located 
near the entrance, "a new work by 
Christopher Wool, made in 
collaboration with Josh Smith" which, 
according to the exhibition literature, 
was intended to "act as a mute sign 
and announcement" of the broader 
curatorial strategies organising the 
show. The other was a short film loop 
derived from Fassbinder's 1979 film 
The Third Generation, and projected 
on the back wall (Schmitz's 
contribution to the show). This loop 
gave no real indication of the film's 
overall theme — although it did 
communicate a sense of intrigue and 
suspense. Instead (and interestingly), 
it was described for visitors only in 
terms of its formal and functional 
effects, as "play[ing] continually in the 
space, providing extra light to read by 
and an activated moment within the 
space".7  
 
The exhibition also offered 'too much'. 
No only were hundreds of publications 
on display, they were strewn, again 
apparently randomly, on and against 
the horizontals and verticals of the red, 
grid-like display structures that Gillick 
had designed for the show. Since they 
were laid out as if with the purpose of 
being picked up, flicked through, even 
read, the visitor was immediately faced 
with the problem of feeling both 
required and unable to engage 
appropriately with/do justice to what 
was being offered. 
 
The Personalisation Minefield 
Given the real possibility that some 
visitors would feel unable to engage 
with the show beyond the level of the 
purely superficial, the ICA did in fact 
proffer a strategy for navigating it. 
During my visits, it was modelled by 
the attendant who, regularly, and with 
apparent casualness, would leave his 
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post and approach the work. He would 
handle it, move it around, and even sit 
down on or amongst it, demonstrating 
that Gillick's surfaces also functioned 
as seating and that the archive on 
display was intended for use. In other 
words, an active and individual route 
through was authorised, but through 
deed rather than word. Thus, visitors 
were expected to utilise the space in a 
variety of ways, as they liked: to 
browse or become absorbed, to stay 
for a while or all day. The relatively 
disorderly nature of the scene also 
made it possible for certain visitors 
(i.e. those involved in self-publishing) 
to incorporate into the collection, 
surreptitiously or overtly, examples of 
their own work in the hope that these 
would travel as part of the Kiosk show 
to its next destination. 
 
Clearly, these personalised and 
participatory ways of engaging with the 
(apparently) relatively unregulated 
display of materials in the exhibition, 
were intended to create an 
atmosphere of openness and 
generosity. Certainly, they had the 
potential to encourage independence 
of thought and individual agency. 
Clearly too, and despite the fact that 
many of the behaviours activated by 
the exhibition (rummaging, reading, 
scanning, etc) tended towards the 
solitary rather than the collective, the 
curatorial project itself was conceived 
from the first as collaborative and 
'relational'.8 Similarly orientated 
approaches, combined with practices 
of analysis and evaluation, 
characterise my own approach to 
curriculum design and teaching and 
that of the department in which I work. 
Nonetheless, personal and 
participatory forms of engagement are 
not sufficient in themselves to enable 
genuine shifts in understanding. 
Indeed, in some instances they may 
actively preclude such learning from 
taking place. 
 
This is because in reality, and unless 
carefully nurtured to the contrary, 
personalised and participatory 
behaviours may function as just 
another manifestation of the 
contemporary drive to consume, with 
new information and experiences 
evaluated purely in terms of individual 
preference and/or merely assimilated 
into habitual frames of reference. 
(Indeed, upon reflection, the layout of 
Kiosk evoked the commercial space of 
a bookshop as much as it did a library 
or reading room.) This observation 
leads to another, namely, that 
although various forms of 
personalisation are becoming 
increasingly strategic within art-
making, curatorial and educational 
contexts, they already have a long and 
complex history of application in the 
worlds of commerce and marketing. I 
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am not suggesting that this connection 
between personalised 
cultural/pedagogical and personalised 
commercial practices somehow 
diminishes the former. Instead, my 
point is firstly that personalised and 
participatory practices should not be 
idealised in and of themselves.9 
Secondly, it is that learning is not 
fundamentally a matter of 
consolidating already-embedded 
patterns of thought, but of questioning 
and possibly departing from them. 
However, situations characterised by 
certain kinds of informational or 
contextual lack, or in which there is 
inadequate critical provocation, can 
result in participants being forced to 
draw solely upon their own, already 
existent resources. Thus, what may 
emerge in and through permissive 
forms of cultural engagement is an 
unchallenged proliferation of attitudes 
that, in the final analysis, are 
autonomous and self-referential as 
well as 'imperialistic'.  
 
As it turns out, such a state of affairs 
was both historicised and critiqued 
almost seventy years ago by the 
German philosopher Martin 
Heidegger. In his 1938 essay ‘The Age 
of the World Picture’ he defined what 
he called the "five essential 
phenomena of the modern age", 
identifying art “under the purview of 
aesthetics” as one of them. 
Accompanying these 'essential 
phenomena', he insisted, was a new 
conception of mankind in which “man 
becomes the primary and only real 
subjectum… the relational centre of 
that which is as such.”10 Where art 
was concerned, he argued, a condition 
emerged in which “… the art work 
becomes the object of mere subjective 
experience, and … consequentially art 
is considered to be the expression of 
human life”.11  
 
An analogous but not identical 
diagnosis has been made more 
recently by the Italian political theorist 
Giorgio Agamben in the opening 
chapter of his book, The Man Without 
Content (1994). In this chapter, 
entitled ‘The Most Uncanny Thing’, he 
too problematises the rise of 
'aesthetics', associating it with a 
process "through which the spectator 
insinuates himself into the concept of 
'art'."12 The ultimate effect of this 
process, he claims, is that it robs art of 
its agency (specifically its capacity to 
invoke terror), thus domesticating it. In 
his view, therefore: 
 
Perhaps nothing is more 
urgent — if we really want 
to engage the problem of 
art in our time — than a 
destruction of aesthetics 
that would… allow us to 
bring into question the very 
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meaning of aesthetics as 
the science of the work of 
art. The question, however, 
is whether the time is ripe 
for such a destruction, or 
whether instead the 
consequence of such an 
act would not be the loss of 
any possible horizon for 
the understanding of the 
work of art and the creation 
of an abyss in front of it 
that could only be crossed 
with a radical leap.13 
 
II 
Embedded 
I'd really like to think that 
the artist could be just 
another kind of material in 
the picture working in 
collaboration with all the 
other materials. But of 
course I know this isn't 
possible really. (Robert 
Rauschenberg)14  
 
In 'The Most Uncanny Thing', 
Agamben, following Nietzsche, 
attempts to counter the problem of the 
work of art's loss of agency by drawing 
attention away from conditions of 
viewing and back onto those of 
making. He writes in terms of "filtering 
the… sensory involvement of the 
spectator [in order to] consider art from 
the point of view of its creator".15 But 
an alternative way forward may be 
proposed, via the notion of critical 
materialities, in which issues of 
reception (including personalised and 
participatory forms of reception) are 
not negated or neglected due to their 
actual or perceived dangers, but 
precisely taken up and taken 
elsewhere. 
 
This 'taking up' and 'taking elsewhere' 
consists of a concretisation and 
contextualisation of the personal that 
accords with patterns found in 
Merleau-Ponty's explorations of 
embodied subjectivity. On the one 
hand, it starts with the affirmation that, 
phenomenologically, one of the 
important ways in which we 
experience ourselves is at the centre 
of things. But this centredness, when it 
is lived, is experienced as having 
certain restrictions at the same time 
that it has a 'unifying' effect: “…the life 
of consciousness," he writes, " — 
cognitive life, the life of desire or 
perceptual life — is subtended [i.e. 
enclosed, surrounded, delimited] by an 
‘intentional arc’ which projects round 
about us our past, our future, our 
human setting, our physical, 
ideological and moral situation, or 
rather which results in our being 
situated in all these respects… It is 
this intentional arc which brings about 
the unity of the senses, of intelligence, 
sensibility and motility.”16  
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As indicated, then, to be centred is 
also to be embedded in sets of (often 
mutating) intersubjective, social, 
historical and ethical structures. As 
such it is an inevitably heterogeneous 
and indeterminate phenomenon, 
relational and entangled, open to 
disruption, even discord. This brings 
me to my second point. From this 
perspective, attending to the personal 
and personalised aspects of our lives 
means also becoming conscious of the 
actuality and singularity of other 
people, things, situations and 
information-flows. When these others 
also become points of focus, questions 
inevitably arise concerning the 
specificities of who we are, and how 
we are, in terms of our 
interconnections with and effects on 
others. And vice versa — for, in 
Merleau-Ponty's words, “Once we are 
aware of the existence of others we 
commit ourselves to being, among 
other things, what they think of us…”17 
From a 'critical materialities' position, it 
is from this unstable place of 
entanglement and difference that new 
forms of thought and action emerge. 
Indeed, this was a principal claim 
made by Merleau-Ponty in his major 
work, the Phenomenology of 
Perception (1945): 
 
The first philosophical act 
would appear to be to 
return to the world of actual 
experience which is prior to 
the objective world, since it 
is in it that we shall be able 
to grasp the theoretical 
basis no less than the 
limits of that objective 
world, restore to things 
their concrete 
physiognomy, to 
organisms their individual 
ways of dealing with the 
world, and to subjectivity 
its inherence in history. 
Our task will be, moreover, 
to rediscover phenomena, 
the layer of living 
experience through which 
other people and things 
are first given to us, the 
system ‘Self-others-things’ 
as it comes into being; to 
re-awaken perception and 
foil its trick of allowing us to 
forget it as a fact and as 
perception in the interest of 
the object which it presents 
to us and of the rational 
tradition to which it gives 
rise.18 
 
However, the capacity to take up 
personalised ways of being in this 
complex, other(ness)-orientated way is 
something that must be learned and 
practised. What are required are 
environments for learning in which it 
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becomes possible to take a productive 
detour from autonomy by scrutinising 
the divergent ways in which the world 
operates as world and the self as self, 
and in which searches for appropriate 
forms of responsiveness are activated 
(individual, collective, cultural, 
political). A vital element, here, can be 
the inclusion of that ‘background’ 
information, referred to earlier, about 
the often-conflicting perceptions, even 
prejudices, experiences, analyses and 
questions that others have raised in 
relation to a given issue, or work, or 
body of knowledge, past and present. 
But only, I think, if this information is 
proffered not in the form of readymade 
formulae or facts, but in order to 
immerse us in difference.  
 
The ICA show actively withheld this 
kind of information. Therefore, whether 
it was able to make this kind of 
learning in-and-through-difference 
possible is an open question. 
Particularly in question is whether it 
provided sufficiently concrete, 
singularised provocations through 
which to divert its participants (those 
already well-informed in the histories 
and theories of contemporary art 
practices and strategies as much as 
those less well schooled) from certain 
well-trodden interpretative paths. I 
wonder, for instance, what new and 
challenging associations would have 
opened up had participants been given 
the opportunity to read the exhibition 
and its strategies of display through 
the knowledge (the 'conceptual' light) 
that the Fassbinder film from which 
Schmitz derived his film-loop was a 
1970s satirical meditation on 
terrorism? On the other hand, though, 
a deeply situated, inter-relational 
sensibility was indicated in other, less 
immediately obvious ways – through 
the decision to name the exhibition 
after one of the individuals who had 
been central to its curation, for 
instance.  
 
Thick Thought 
I remain interested in art as 
a carrier of refusal. Art can 
embody inarticulate pleas 
for viewing the world in a 
different order. (Liam 
Gillick)19 
 
By his proposal to re-prioritise the 
maker over the viewer within the field 
of art, Agamben intends a shift of 
focus from "the [Kantian] disinterested 
spectator to the interested artist."20 
What concerns him here is "the idea 
that extreme risk is implicit in the 
artist's activity"21 and that this sense of 
risk should also attend the viewing of 
art, individually and collectively. 
However, an outcome of Agamben's 
reversal is that the agency of the work 
of art itself is occluded insofar as it 
may be experienced as 
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resisting/disregarding the intentions, 
projections, passions and 
interpretations of both maker and 
viewer. Again, the notion of critical 
materialities offers an alternative. For it 
is so configured that it involves 
embracing precisely the phenomenal 
world's resistant registers. It does so 
by engaging with the opacity and 
muteness of matter. This opacity and 
muteness is not regarded as an 
absence or ‘abyss’ or as a problem to 
be overcome but in the words of Jean-
Luc Nancy, as a “non-communication 
of meaning or non-delivery of a 
message."22  
 
  
 
One of the effects of materiality's 
muteness, when experienced as a 
resistant force, is that in the face of it 
we too become mute. Merleau-Ponty 
describes this as a state of being in 
which "the watchwords of knowledge 
and action lose their meaning and 
force.”23 But with this loss of speech 
and, more pointedly, of judgement (as 
well as of other acts that are normally 
associated with intellectual or critical 
work), alternate forms of attention, 
relating, and thus knowing, come into 
focus.  
 
From a phenomenological perspective, 
it is a form of knowing that has as its 
basis the (always incomplete) self-
showing of the phenomenon or the 
thing itself, from out of itself, that is, on 
its terms, not ours. This is a position 
that is often associated with a pre-
modern sensibility, a topic on which 
Umberto Eco has written in his The 
Aesthetics of Thomas Aquinas (1988). 
Reflecting on the differences between 
pre-modern and modern 
understandings of knowledge (in this 
case, knowledge of the beautiful), he 
compares a notion of beauty as 
"objectively present in things without 
the help or hindrance of man" with an 
alternate "kind of objectivism [which] 
considers beauty to be a 
transcendental property also, but a 
property which is disclosed in relation 
to a knowing subject." The latter he 
connects with "a substantial move in 
the direction of humanism.”24 Where 
this issue of non-human-centred self-
showing is concerned, Merleau-
Ponty's reflections on, and affection for 
Cézanne's paintings are also apt. For 
one of the factors of interest to him 
was the power of these paintings to 
immerse viewers in what he called pre-
personal or 'anonymous' modes of 
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being: “[n]ature itself is stripped of the 
attributes which make it ready for 
animistic communions," he wrote in 
'Cézanne's Doubt', "there is no wind in 
the landscape, no movement on the 
Lac d’Annecy; the frozen objects 
hesitate at the beginning of the world. 
It is an unfamiliar world in which one is 
uncomfortable and which forbids all 
human effusiveness.”25 Early on in the 
essay he referred to the “inhuman” 
character of Cézanne’s works and to 
the painter’s comment that “a face 
should be painted as an object.”26 
Here, then, the world does not present 
itself as being for-us. Rather, a 
position is opened up that is inimical to 
the subject-centred intellectual and 
aesthetic sensibilities of humanism. 
 
As already indicated, in this regard 
critical materialities refers to 
knowledges that are rooted in pre-
linguistic, pre-rational and pre-
objective bodily logics, 
correspondences and exchanges. 
These knowledges via contact must 
also be learned, however, specifically 
through such other(ness)-directed 
practices of being present, attending 
and waiting. Interestingly, in his essay 
'The Thing Itself' (published in 1984 in 
the volume Potentialities), Agamben 
provides these apparently non-
intellectualist practices with a Platonic 
provenance. Citing a little-known text 
known as Plato's 'Seventh Letter', in 
which the topic of ‘the thing itself’ [to 
pragma auto] is the point of focus, he 
quotes Plato as follows: 
  
There does not exist, not 
will there ever exist, any 
treatise of mine dealing 
with this thing. For it does 
not at all admit of verbal 
expression like other 
disciplines [mathēmata], 
but after one has dwelt for 
a long time close to the 
thing itself [peri to pragma 
auto], and in communion 
with it, it is suddenly 
brought to birth in the soul, 
as light that is kindled by a 
leaping spark; and then it 
nourishes itself [auto 
heauto ēdē trefei]" … the 
knowledge of the thing 
itself suddenly emerges in 
'rubbing together names, 
definitions, visions and 
sense perceptions, proving 
them in benevolent proofs 
and discussions without 
envy'.27 
 
As Kaja Silverman has pointed out in 
her book World Spectators (2000), a 
theme of knowledge through contact in 
which phenomena/experiences of 
'rubbing' are central, recurs in Leo 
Bersani’s writing also, specifically his 
writing about the ways in which it is 
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precisely in situations of the most 
profound 'corporeal convergence', as 
in erotic encounters, that profound 
encounters with difference are also 
able to emerge. Referencing Bersani’s 
book Homos (1995) and admitting, 
incidentally, that she is using his ideas 
somewhat outside of their original 
context, she writes that “the subject is 
at such moments ‘so obscenely 
"rubbed" by the object it anticipates 
mastering that the very boundaries 
separating subject from object, 
boundaries necessary for possession 
[are] erased’." She continues:  
 
The dissolution of identity 
about which Bersani 
writes… is no more lasting 
than the erotic encounter 
through which it is effected. 
However, when one body 
moves away from another, 
it leaves behind what might 
be called the ‘traces of 
difference.’ When the now 
solitary subject attempts to 
reconstitute itself, these 
traces of difference stick in 
the gears of the egoic 
machinery. The result is an 
inaccurate self-replication. 
In Arts of Impoverishment 
(1993), Bersani and Ulysse 
Dutoit dream of setting in 
motion an infinite series of 
these inaccurate self-
replications. In Homos, 
Bersani intimates that 
inaccurate self-replication 
might also lead to an 
appetite for alterity, and so 
to a different relation to 
other creatures and 
things.28 
 
If I may refer again to the ICA 
installation, on a phenomenal level it 
was precisely the possibility of these 
hard-to-articulate knowledges-through-
contact that it was in the process of 
opening up. In other words, when 
considered in terms of what it was 
presenting rather than what it had 
withheld, the installation was, I think, 
gesturing primarily towards corporeal 
acts of dwelling in/'rubbing up against' 
its own textures and rhythms. My own 
corporeal route through the 
installation, for instance, was one in 
which the show's abstract, 
compositional and coloristic qualities 
took the lead. Nonetheless, I would 
have liked the challenge of an more 
resistant, recalcitrant environment. 
For, initially at least, I found that I had 
reverted to type, navigating according 
to my own aesthetic inclinations. But it 
is also true that it was through my 
attention to these issues of form and 
facture that I was led to think about 
this show in relation, and in 
comparison, to certain other, not 
dissimilarly composed installations that 
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Gillick has constructed over the years 
(i.e. Consultation Partition, 2000 or 
Local Discussion Screen, 2001-02) 
and to the particularised questions and 
interactions that they continue to 
provoke. 
 
III 
 
The movement of critical materialities 
as described here has been a 
movement in two contradictory but 
over-lapping directions, towards the 
radically and concretely personal and 
located, and towards the radically 
decentered and anonymous. Where 
both of them end up, however, is 
immersed in difference. These 
movements seem important since 
cumulatively they produce attitudes 
that run counter to the acquisitiveness 
that is generally operative in culture 
and increasingly in the worlds of 
learning. The question that activates 
me now concerns how best to enable 
these flows to be enacted in the 
specific, contemporary educational 
contexts with which I am involved. My 
suspicion is that, as with the ICA show 
as I have described it, it will probably 
involve attempting but never managing 
to balance acts of proffering and 
withholding. But I write this in a 
positive spirit because at issue is not 
finding a foolproof methodology. It is, 
above all, a question of individual 
locatedness and singularised 
questings in the midst of many other, 
similarly unstable materialised 
positionings and self-showings, with 
the aim of provoking thought and 
interaction. Having said that, however, 
there are some precedents for this 
doubled approach to be found in the 
personalised yet collaborative 
exploratory practices characteristic of 
such early-mid twentieth-century art 
institutions as the Bauhaus in Dessau 
(Germany) and Black Mountain 
College in North Carolina (USA). I am 
thinking particularly of the work of 
Friedl Dicker-Brandeis, Johannes 
Itten, and Josef and Anni Albers. Of 
particular relevance, from my 
perspective, are the relationships that 
emerged between the pedagogical 
intentions of these practitioners on the 
one hand and their art-making and 
teaching practices on the other. Take 
the Albers. On the one hand there was 
Josef Albers' learner-centred claim 
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that "[t]he pupil and his [or her] 
growing into the world are more 
important than the teacher and his [or 
her] background."29 On the other hand 
there was his art-making/teaching 
practice that seemed in many ways to 
be directed towards the pre-personal, 
rooted as it was in abstraction and 
focused on the communicative 
possibilities inherent to the material, 
textural, compositional and perceptual 
qualities of things. I am not alone in 
my interest in these practices of 
course. Note the recent exhibitions 
'Starting at Zero: Black Mountain 
College 1933-57' at the Arnolfini in 
Bristol and Kettle's Yard, Cambridge 
and 'Albers and Moholy-Nagy: From 
the Bauhaus to the New World' at Tate 
Modern during 2006. Both of these 
exhibitions had an historical, 
retrospective emphasis. But I would 
like to think about how I might 
'transcribe' the material knowledges 
enacted by those artist-educationalists 
into present and future scenarios. 
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